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THEORICA ET PRACTICA: 
HISTORICAL EPISTEMOLOGY 
AND THE RE-VISIONING 
OF THIRTEENTH AND 
FOURTEENTH-CENTURY 
MEDICINE
Abstract: Positivist medical historians, 
guided by the savoir of modern western 
biomedicine, have long depicted medi-
eval medicine as an aberration along the 
continuum of scientifi c and medical pro-
gress. Historical epistemology, founded 
in the ideas of Cavailles, Foucault, 
Davidson, and Hacking, however, allows 
the historian to disrupt this false contin-
uum and to unchain medieval medicine 
from modern medicine. Postmodernist 
approaches, such as those sourced in 
Lyotard, Barthes, and Derrida, allow 
the historian to further deconstruct 
medieval and modern medical discourse, 
revealing a multitude of narrative lenses 
spinning around biomedical and bio-
cultural strands. In liberating these two 
medical systems and setting them within 
the distinct historical and epistemologi-
cal contexts that both shaped and were 
shaped by them, the historian can re-
vision the theories, practices, and culture 
of medieval medicine without having to 
anachronistically justify them according 
to modern medical discourse.
Keywords: Foucault; medieval medi-
cine; savoir; narrative; Evidence-Based 
Medicine (EBM)
Th eorica et practica: 
historická epistemologie a re-vize 
lékařství třináctého a čtrnáctého 
století
Abstrakt: Pozitivističtí historikové 
lékařství, vedeni savoir moderní zá-
padní biomedicíny, po  dlouhou dobu 
líčili středověké lékařství jako odchylku 
z  kontinua vědeckého a  medicínského 
pokroku. Historická epistemologie, zalo-
žená na  myšlenkách Cavaillese, Fou-
caulta, Davidsona a  Hackinga, však 
umožňuje rozrušit toto falešné konti-
nuum a  odpoutat středověké lékařství 
od moderní medicíny. Postmodernistické 
přístupy, jako ty jež vycházejí z Lyotarda, 
Barthese a  Derridy, dávají historikovi 
další možnost dekonstruovat středověký 
a moderní medicínský diskurz a odhalit 
množství narativních optik, jež se prolé-
tají kolem biomedicínských a biokultur-
ních vláken. Tím, že tyto dva medicínské 
systémy osvobodí a  zasadí je do  odliš-
ných historických a  epistemologických 
kontextů, jež je utvářely a  zároveň jimi 
byly utvářeny, může historik re-vidovat 
teorie, praktiky a  kulturu středověkého 
lékařství, aniž by je musel anachronis-
ticky ospravedlňovat vůči modernímu 
medicínskému diskurzu.
Klíčová slova: Foucault; středověké 
lékařství; savoir; narativ; medicína zalo-
žená na důkazech (EBM)
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Th eorica I: Foucault and the foundations of historical epistemology – 
truth, knowledge, power, and the history of medicine
Arnold I. Davidson, in “On Epistemology and Archaeology: From Canguil-
hem to Foucault,” qualifi es historical epistemology as a “methodologically 
distinctive strain of the history and philosophy of science,” one rooted in 
the philosophical traditions of Gaston Bachelard, Francois Delaporte, Louis 
Althusser, and Michel Foucault.1 Amorphous in both theory and practice 
and therefore diffi  cult to defi ne categorically, historical epistemology is 
nevertheless hallmarked by an awareness of the diverse philosophies–and 
through them the spoken and unspoken assumptions–of a given historical 
moment and the relationship of these philosophies to historical phenom-
ena, in this case the theory and practice of medicine. In this way, histori-
cal epistemology is a multi-dimensional pursuit that examines the deeper 
structures of abstract knowledge in conjunction with the phenomenological 
life worlds that it both shapes and refl ects,2 and then sets these reciprocal 
forces in motion through historical epochs so that we may see change over 
time. Foucault’s work in the history and philosophy of science illuminates 
these relationships, bringing distant images into sharper relief and clouding 
those that we have come to accept as true; although problematic, Foucault’s 
approach to history provides the historian with powerful conceptual tools 
for “doing” historical epistemology.3
 Foucault’s ideas were in constant motion, shift ing and rematerializing 
in a variety of forms from Madness in Civilization and Th e Birth of the Clinic 
to Th e Order of Th ings, Th e Archaeology of Knowledge, and Discipline and 
Punish, and so it is impossible to formulate from them a  unifi ed system; 
nevertheless, within and between these texts an ascending hierarchy of 
knowledge can be discerned, with the fi rst level being epistemology, the 
second being archeology, and the third being genealogy. For Foucault, epis-
temology is comprised of the theoretical structures, or epistemonomique,
the conceptual material, or epistemocritique, and the fi elds of application 
for these structures and materials, or epistemologique, within the discourse 
1  Arnold I. DAVIDSON, Th e Emergence of Sexuality: Historical Epistemology and the Formation 
of Concepts. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 2001, p.193
2  Edmund HUSSERL, Th e Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970 (1936).
3  In their introduction to Reassessing Foucault, James COLIN and Roy PORTER write that 
“No one should approach Foucault in the expectation that his work contained, potentially 
at least, an interpretation, a solution, of every historical problem, or even a methodology or 
a tool-kit.” Reassessing Foucault. London: Routledge 1998, p. 5. 
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of a specifi c scientifi c discipline. In the context of thirteenth and fourteenth 
century academic medicine, the epistemonomique would be Aristotelian 
categories and qualities, as well as the theories of sympathies, antipathies, 
and humors that form the basic foundations of medical theory. Th e epis-
temocritique, then, would be practical and concrete medical knowledge, 
much of which was predicated on these theories, and found in treatises 
such as Rhazes’ Almansoris, Avicenna’s Qanun, and Ibn-Jazzar’s al-Musafi r, 
a medical text that circulated in the Latin west under the guise of Constan-
tine’s Viaticum.4 Th e ways in which these theoretical concepts might operate 
in the practice of medicine, for example who should receive treatment and 
how therapy should be applied, constitute the epistemologique. Th ese three 
epistemological elements work together within the discipline of medieval 
academic medicine to determine medical “truth or falsity,” a concept related 
to Foucault’s “will to truth,” in which a given dialogical concept is rational 
and valid, and therefore either true or false, or irrational and invalid, and 
therefore monstrous.5
If epistemology is primarily concerned with intradisciplinary connais-
sance, archaeology, the next level in the hierarchy of knowledge, moves 
beyond disciplinary boundaries to examine the overarching assumptions 
shared by several disciplines. Th ese assumptions, which Foucault termed 
savoir, or knowledge, are the “rules that determine what kinds of sentences 
are going to count as true or false in some domain.”6 Savoir, then, exists 
beyond “truth or falsity” and yet structures the possibilities for “truth or 
falsity” in overlapping discursive regimes. Digging through historical texts 
to uncover these deeper structures, what Ian Hacking calls “depth knowl-
edge,” reveals the unspoken language that determines the shape of discourse 
and guides the possibility of scientifi c inquiry and interpretation.7 In other 
words, savoir is not the “web of specifi c sentences that were uttered” in 
any given historical period, but “what made it possible for those sentences 
to be uttered (largely regardless of who uttered them).”8 For example, the 
4  For a general overview of these texts, see Nancy SIRAISI, Medieval and Early Renaissance 
Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge and Practice. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1990.
5  Michel FOUCAULT, Th e Order of Th ings: An Archeology of the Human Sciences. New York: 
Vintage 1994.
6  Ian HACKING, “Th e Archaeology of Michel Foucault.” In: Historical Ontology. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, p. 77.
7  Ibid.
8  Ibid. For Foucault’s development of these ideas, see: Madness and Civilization: A History of 
Insanity in the Age of Reason. New York: Vintage 1965; Th e Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology 
of Medical Perception. New York: Pantheon 1973.
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archaeology of the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century academic milieu, 
which held that ancient textual authorities such as Aristotle could not be 
questioned, that Aristotelian logic was the highest form of proof and truth, 
and that Aristotelian modes of discourse were valid above all others, delim-
ited the possibilities of truth and falsity across several disciplines, including 
theology, natural philosophy, law, and of course, medicine. Aristotelian 
norms and assumptions determined the shape of discourse in each of these 
fi elds; in the domain of medicine, the deep knowledge that Aristotelian 
methods “proved truth” led to a medical discourse that was predicated on 
Aristotelian categories and logic and that favored the use and production 
of Aristotelian-based medical texts such as the Galenic Corpus, Avicenna’s 
Qanun, and their progeny. Th e taxonomy, pathology, and cure of disease, 
as well as the qualities of materia medica–the discursive facts of medieval 
medicine–were shaped and validated by Aristotelian layers of discourse cur-
rent in the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century university. Th is archaeology 
not only determined what was true and valid, but also what was false and 
invalid, namely those healing practices or medical texts that did not fi t into 
the Aristotelian schema.
Foucault argues that archaeology, or deep knowledge, informs and 
shapes scientifi c discourse; as such, it is at the level of archaeology that the 
historian can unearth the underlying modes and structures that catalyze 
scientifi c change. Heroic scientifi c inquiry and discovery in and of them-
selves do  not drive the progress of scientifi c knowledge. Instead, it is the 
savoir behind the sciences that shift s, expands, and contracts the possi-
bilities for truth in discourse and allows for new ideas to compete with and, 
in some cases, replace older ones.9 By focusing on the deeper knowledge 
behind discourse rather than the acts of individuals, it is possible to avoid 
both objectivist and positivist approaches that tend to fl atten the history of 
medicine into a grand narrative leading from the genius of Hippocrates to 
the glorious now of western biomedicine, as if all were neatly pre-arranged. 
Historical epistemology deconstructs such a narrative, allowing truth and 
falsity, success and failure, to have equal voices in the complex discourse of 
9  Th e idea that scientifi c concepts are replaced by new ones and, in eff ect, cease to exist was 
introduced by Bachelard and elaborated upon by Jean CAVAILLES in his Sur la logique et 
la théorie des sciences. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1960. Discontinuity theory 
in historical epistemology will be discussed at length below. See also DAVIDSON, Th e 
Emergence of Sexuality, p. 129, and David Jalal HYDER, “Foucault, Cavaillès, and Husserl on 
the Historical Epistemology of the Sciences.” Perspectives on Science, vol. 11, 2003, no. 1, p. 119.
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diverse historical moments, while exploring both ruptures and continuities 
within and between discursive regimes.
By way of example, let us briefl y examine the heart as concept in late-
medieval and early modern medical and cultural contexts. Th irteenth- and 
fourteenth-century medical discourse was guided by the textual authority 
of Galen, the philosophical authority of Aristotle,10 and the belief that the 
human body was open to the spiritual and physical macrocosm of which it 
was an integral part. In the second century CE, Galen conducted a broad 
range of animal vivisections that served as the foundation for his treatise, 
De Usu Partium, which circulated widely in the late-medieval academic 
milieu, albeit in abbreviated form.11 In this text, Galen distinguished be-
tween the veins and arteries, as well as the venous and arterial blood that 
they contained, and postulated that the pulse, which was observable, was 
produced in the arteries themselves. Th e heart did not pump, but sucked 
blood from the liver through the veins; once in the heart, this venous blood 
would be revivifi ed with pneuma and fl ow out through the arteries, never 
to return. Where did it go? Humoral theory, central to medieval medicine, 
held that excess blood was burned off  through strenuous exercise or purged, 
in the case of women, through menstruation. Blood could also be cooked, 
a process that Hippocrates termed krasis, into other humors useable by the 
body.12 Like liquid in a lava lamp, humoral blood waxed and waned in the 
body in response to various factors, such as diet, weather, regimen, therapy, 
and emotions–the Galenic non-naturals. Because humoral theory held that 
blood could be transformed and evaporated and burned like fuel, there was 
no need for it to return to the heart and be recycled. Within this guiding 
savoir, the heart was not–and in fact could never be–a pump. Such an idea 
would have been not only invalid according to late-medieval archaeology, 
but also monstrous.
Th e savoir of the later Middle Ages, furthermore, ascribed values and 
functions to the heart that existed along the interstices of medicine and 
10  Heart and blood were closely related because of the medieval theory of sympathies. Following 
the Aristotelian system of qualities, the heart was red, moist, and warm, just as blood was red, 
moist, and warm; both heart and blood, therefore belonged in the same Aristotelian category 
and were expected to function in similar ways.
11  Luis GARCÍA BALLESTER – John ARRIZABALAGA (eds.), Galen and Galenism: Th eory 
and Medical Practice from Antiquity to the European Renaissance. Burlington: Ashgate Press 
2002.
12  Volker LANGHOLF, Medical Th eories in Hippocrates: Early Texts and the Epidemics. Berlin: 
Walter de Gruyter 1990, p. 79–84.
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theology. Th e heart was not only an organ, but also–and perhaps more 
importantly–the seat of emotion and a source for the passions of the soul 
that could both cause illness and evoke cure within the human body.13
Nourished within the macrocosmic heart, the state of the microcosmic 
soul infl uenced the health of the physical body; for this reason, the passions 
of the soul were as much a concern for physicians as for theologians. Th e 
interrelationship between the heart, the passions, and the body led to the 
medical belief that overly-ardent and unrequited human love could cause ill-
ness. Th ose suff ering from an erratic pulse, loss of appetite, listlessness and 
despair were diagnosed with a disease known in medieval Islamic medicine 
as al-Ishq and in the Latin west as hereos, or lovesickness.14 For medieval 
Christians, the heart was also the locus of ardent religious devotion and 
adoration which, like lovesickness, physically manifested itself in the body. 
Th e Virgin Mary’s heart was pierced seven-fold as Christ’s sacred heart was 
pierced to redeem the world, while the hearts of the pious were soft ened by 
compassion and warmed in prayer. In the later Middle Ages, mystics such as 
Lutgard of Aywières, Margarete Porete, and Julian of Norwich would seek 
ecstatic union with Christ, meditating on the dove-hole of His heart.15 Lut-
gard longed so ardently for Christ that her heart seemed to burst, rupturing 
her side and soaking her tunic with blood.16 Th e physicality of mystic union 
with Christ is further witnessed in the case of saintly Clare of Montefalco, 
an Augustinian nun who claimed that Christ had come to her in a vision 
and planted His Cross in her heart.17 Aft er Clare’s death in 1308, her fellow 
sisters conducted an autopsy in which they discovered the instruments of 
13  For medical treatises in this tradition, see GALEN, On the Passions and Errors of the Soul. 
Paul W. Harkins - Walther Riese (trans.). Columbus: Ohio State University Press 1963. 
RHAZES, Th e Spiritual Physick of Rhazes. Arthur J. Arberry (trans.). London: John Murray 
1950.
14  On lovesickness in Islam, see Michael DOLS, Al Majnun: Th e Madman in Medieval Islamic 
Society. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1992. For lovesickness in the medieval west, see Mary 
Frances WACK, “Th e Liber de heros morbo of Johannes Affl  acius and Its Implications for 
Medieval Love Conventions.” Speculum, vol. 62, 1987, no. 2, p. 324–344.
15  On the metaphor of the dove-hole, see BERNARD OF CLAIRVAUX, Sermons on the Song of 
Songs. Collegeville: Liturgical Press (Cistercian Publications) 2005. 
16  Th omas CANTIMPRÉ, Th e Life of Lutgard of Aywières. Margot King (trans.) Toronto: 
Peregrina Publishing, 1989.
17  Enrico MENESTÒ (ed.), Il processo per la canonizzazzione di Chiara da Montefalco. Perugia: 
Quaderni del centro per il collegamento degli studi medievali e umanistici nell’università di 
Perugia 1984; also see mention in Nancy CACIOLA, “Mystics, Demoniacs, and the Physiology 
of Spirit Possession in Medieval Europe.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 42, 
2000, no. 2, p. 268–306.
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Christ’s passion physically emblazoned on her heart, evidence of its central-
ity in ardent devotion and love.18 In opening Clare’s body, the sisters and 
physicians found exactly what they had expected, what they already believed 
to exist and what they knew they would fi nd. In this way, both the gaze 
and discourse of medicine were conditioned by the archaeology of the later 
Middle Ages, a tangled web of theological, spiritual, and philosophical as-
sumptions that delimited the possibilities for understanding the nature and 
function of the heart.
On October 22, 1887, William and Robert Chambers published the fol-
lowing in their Journal of Popular Literature, Science and Arts: “Th e heart is 
not the source or seat of the emotions…it is simply a hollowed out muscle, 
which expands to receive the blood from the veins, and contracts to propel 
it again through the arteries. It is merely a natural pump…Th e heart does 
not feel emotion.”19 What has led to this change in perspective? “A familiar 
history of science,” Ian Hacking writes, “would tell us a  tale of heroes,” 20 
one in which the actions of a  solitary genius might change the course of 
history across the centuries. Perhaps the most likely hero in this positivist 
drama would be a  seventeenth-century man named Dr.  William Harvey, 
Lumleian Lecturer at the London College of Physicians and personal physi-
cian to King James I, whose fi ndings relative to the circulation of the blood 
were introduced in a treatise entitled Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis 
et Sanguinis in Animalibus. First published in Latin at Frankfurt am Main 
in 1628, Harvey’s treatise circulated widely in both the medical and scientifi c 
communities in England and on the Continent.21 Almost immediately, his 
theory that the heart acted as a pump sparked controversy among learned 
physicians, only a  small percentage of whom would accept such a  radical 
departure from established medical tradition.22 Harvey’s observation that 
the heart and blood move, however, had been made by earlier physicians 
18  See Katharine PARK, Secrets of Women: Gender, Generation, and the Origins of Human 
Dissection. New York: Zone Books 2006.
19  William CHAMBERS – Robert CHAMBERS, Journal of Popular Literature, Science, and 
Arts. Edinburgh: W & R Chambers 1887, p. 683.
20  HACKING, “Th e Archaeology of Michel Foucault,” p. 77.
21  Linda PAYNE, “‘With much nausea, loathing, and foetor’: William Harvey, Dissection, and 
Dispassion in Early Modern Medicine.” Vesalius: Acta Internationales Historiae Medicinae, 
vol. 3, 2002, no. 2, p. 45–52.
22  On the oposition to Harvey, see Roger Kenneth FRENCH, William Harvey’s Natural 
Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994.
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and anatomists, including Herophilus and Erasistratus, Galen, Ibn-Nafi s,23
Michael Servetus, and Andreas Vesalius, as well as anyone who had butch-
ered an animal, killed another person in battle, or watched a  vivisection. 
If the pumping action of the heart was so readily witnessed, why wasn’t it 
postulated and accepted before the seventeenth century? What elements led 
to its ultimate acceptance, at fi rst among an elite group of physicians, and 
what can account for this rupture?
Th e traditional narrative in the history of science would have held that 
Harvey, a brilliant individual, used his own unique powers of observation 
and keen intelligence to see that which had never been seen before and to 
interpret this vision for the scientifi c community. Starting from this prem-
ise, it was Harvey and his discovery that ultimately created a  new way of 
understanding the heart and its function in circulation, which is in part 
true, but makes a  symptom into a  cause, which is problematic. From the 
perspective of Foucauldian archaeology, it was not Harvey’s individual ef-
forts, but the deeper structures of the seventeenth-century–particularly the 
tension between Aristotelian-Galenic textual authority and Baconian meth-
ods that emphasized observation and experimentation in the acquisition 
of knowledge–that opened new possibilities of truth and falsity across the 
disciplines. Harvey’s treatise refl ected both of these epistemologies; a com-
mitted Aristotelian, he began with the whole organism, “as that which has to 
be explained, and to proceed backwards in time to its ultimate beginnings, 
almost prime matter.”24 He combined the authority of Aristotelian deduction 
with direct and careful observation and the collection of data, a hallmark of 
what would become known as the Baconian method.25 In eff ect, his treatise 
was double-coded, thereby speaking to Aristotelians who might accept his 
theory based on the structure of his arguments as well as those proponents 
of the new science who saw the power of observation and experimentation 
as primary epistemologies.26 Ultimately, proponents of the scientifi c method 
who traced their roots to Bacon would come to dominate scientifi c discourse 
23  Peter E. PORMANN – Emilie SAVAGE-SMITH, Medieval Islamic Medicine. Washington: 
Georgetown University Press 2007, p. 47.
24  FRENCH, William Harvey’s Natural Philosophy, p. 327.
25  French argues that Harvey’s use of observation and experimentation did not make him 
a Baconian; as an Aristotelian, there was much in the Novo Organum that he would untenable. 
FRENCH, p. 326.
26  On the postmodernist theory of double-coding, see discussion below; also, Charles JENCKS, 
Th e Language of Post-Modern Architecture. New York: Rizzoli 1977.
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and reconstruct Harvey as one of their heroes, which required the erasure 
of his fundamental Aristotelianism, thereby sterilizing him for a new age.
Harvey’s theory of the heart as mechanical pump, which spoke two 
languages of authority in its own milieu, would have had little infl uence in 
the fourteenth century. Medieval scholars would have recognized the va-
lidity of his arguments because they were rooted in Aristotelian discourse; 
however, because the authoritative discourse of Galenic anatomy was tied 
directly to humoral theory, Harvey’s mechanistic conclusions would have 
been invalid. Th e primary function of blood was fuel, which could not be 
recycled, rendering the concept of heart-as-pump untenable. Also impos-
sible was the idea that the heart was “merely” an organ and not the seat of 
emotion and religious devotion. Th at Christ touched Clare of Montefalco’s 
heart was a physical truth, proven in a dissection of the organ itself. Star-
ing into Clare’s bisected heart, Harvey would have seen the conjunction of 
the four ventricles and a series of valves, while Clare’s sisters saw the Cross 
with Christ crucifi ed and the arma Christi ringing Him like a halo. In both 
cases, it is archaeology that delineates truth and falsity and guides empirical 
observation and scientifi c inquiry, and not the other way round.
In both the late-medieval and early-modern worlds, it is archaeology 
that shapes medical discourse, delimiting what is and is not possible at 
a  given historical moment. Epistemological modifi cations in medical dis-
course stem not from the acts of brilliant individuals, but from changes in 
the “rules according to which [biological] discourses formed their objects, 
defi ned their concepts, and constituted their theories.”27 If the truth or falsity 
of a medical claim is subjective to the savoir that shaped it, then each medi-
cal claim must be examined within this larger context; since each historical 
context has its own savoir, it is not productive to judge one medical truth by 
a the archaeology of a diff erent period. Th e question becomes not whether 
a medical concept is true or false, but instead why it was deemed to be true or 
false in a particular historical moment, why it is not held to be true or false at 
another historical moment, and why the truth or falsity of a medical concept 
concerns the historian and his or her audience so.
All of this, of course, exists at the level of discourse; human history, 
however, takes place in space and time and involves actors both real and 
imaginary on a phenomenological stage. Such is the problem addressed in 
Foucault’s fi nal level of knowledge, genealogy, in which very real human ac-
tors are not only subject to discourse, which is over again subject to deeper 
27  DAVIDSON, Th e Emergence of Sexuality, p. 195.
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structures, but also play an active role in generating this discourse and the 
institutions that support it. Foucault argued that the creation and control of 
language within discursive communities was an extension of abstract power 
that had very real consequences in human society. In Madness and Civiliza-
tion (1961), for example, the creation of the categories of madness led to the 
“othering” of those defi ned as mad and the creation of institutions for their 
coercion and control. Th is argument was continued in an elaborated form in 
Discipline and Punish (1975), which examined the ways in which discursive 
regimes of power guided ideas about, institutions for, and the punishment 
of the constructed other. In both of these examples, the consequences of 
human action are real, but self-aware and self-willed human action is almost 
entirely absent. Th is is, perhaps, the central problem arising from Foucault’s 
genealogy for the philosopher and the historian: the role of human agency. 
For Foucault, humans are never free from discursive regimes of power and 
the institutions–physical and verbal, visible and invisible–that they create, 
and what human agency exists is bound and shaped by the archaeology of 
each historical moment. But certainly human beings are not mere slaves to 
invisible forces that control our actions in the material world, the agents 
of power are not wholly abstract and invisible, and individuals as well as 
communities have made very real diff erences both within and beyond the 
archaeologies of their historical moments. Where Foucault leaves off , the 
historian must pick up, carefully weaving together facts and fi ctions in cul-
tural, historical, and ideological contexts, while putting a face on the agents 
of power and change, subject and object, health and illness, medicine and 
healing.
Th eorica II: Th e linguistic turn beyond Foucault – postmodernist 
discourse, the decentered narrative, and double coding in the history 
of medicine
An historical epistemology that rests in the epistemological, archaeological, 
and genealogical structures of Foucault off ers a  meaningful approach to 
the history of medicine, both modern and pre-modern.28 While Foucault’s 
non-systematic theoretical framework allows for the liberation of previously 
28  It is interesting to note that where we once categorized the history of medicine as ancient, 
medieval, renaissance, early modern, and modern, we now group eras before the twentieth 
century as pre-modern. Th is trend is perhaps a refl ection of the shift ing academic landscape 
which demands utility and relevance of its disciplines and fi elds of inquiry; for scholars of 
“bad medicine,” so to speak, there is strength in numbers.
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occluded narratives in the history of medicine, it simultaneously ensnares 
the historian–and human history–in a closed linguistic system that denies 
human agency in the processes of change. Deeply rooted in the linguistic 
theories of Ferdinand de Sassure, as well as Nietzsche and Heidegger, Fou-
cault argued that we are fundamentally trapped in language, that our real-
ity is constructed and constricted by levels of discourse. Because humans 
“cognize wholly in language,” and there is nothing beyond that language, 
the articulation of ideas is “limited to the preexisting possibilities allowed 
by the subject’s linguistically constructed reality.”29 Such a closed linguistic 
system all but eliminates the possibility for human agency in the innova-
tion of new ideas, as well as our own ability to understand the discursive 
regimes of the past, dooming us to infi nite levels of futile discourse without 
understanding.30
Th e Foucauldian approach, it would seem, leads the historian of medi-
cine to an ideological and methodological impasse; postmodernist theories 
associated with the linguistic and narrative turns, however, provide the 
historian with several balls of thread to follow through this Daedalean 
philosophical labyrinth. When set into motion, Lyotard’s destruction of 
metastructures, Barthes’ deconstruction of the text through multi-discipli-
nary lenses, and Derrida’s decentering of text and reader might allow us to 
imagine the history of medicine as an endless chain of decentered signifi ers 
oscillating around a multifaceted and invisible core, much like the double 
helix of DNA. Here, the fulcrum represents an abstract and unattainable 
historical “truth,” while the nucleobases that form and inform the larger 
organism represent an ever-replicating collection of narratives generated 
through postmodernist theory. Around the core labeled medieval history of 
medicine, then, there exist several narrative lenses: that of theology and the 
individual theologian, medicine and the individual physician, the patient 
and those around him or her, and–perhaps most importantly–the multiple 
lenses of the modern reader.
29  Michael L. FITZHUGH – William H. LECKIE, “Agency, Postmodernism, and the Causes of 
Change.” History and Th eory, vol. 40, 2001, no. 4 (Th eme Issue: Agency aft er Postmodernism), 
p.64.
30  Our “search for the deep ontological ground hidden by discourse as well as any attempt to 
resuscitate the lost intelligibility of a discipline that was taken seriously in another age” dooms 
us to infi nite levels of futile discourse without understanding. Hubert L. DREYFUS – Paul 
RABINOW, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1983, p. 14.
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In his seminal work, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir, fi rst 
published in 1979, Jean-François Lyotard argued that the advanced technol-
ogy of the modern world had produced myriad and prolifi c ways of com-
municating ideas, such that no controlling set of ideologies–or ideologues 
for that matter–could be said to guide discourse.31 Sweeping narratives such 
as “Romanticism” and “Marxism,” therefore, were no longer tenable frame-
works for understanding the past, just as overarching structures could tell 
us nothing of the present. With the death of the metanarrative, there must 
also be a destruction of the metastructures associated with grand concepts 
such as “progress,” “healing,” and “illness,” all of which are far too complex 
for a  simple narrative to convey their multivalent meanings. In the place 
of these meta-frameworks, we are left  with communication that is primar-
ily linguistic and symbolic, continually questioning itself, churning and 
changing second by second like a rolling cloud of ideas. Th is cloud did not, 
however, roll without purpose; according to Lyotard, symbolic and linguis-
tic communication suggested a central truth, but one which human beings 
could not attain because of our limited intellectual capacity.
In Lyotard, the focus of history becomes decentered; with metanarra-
tives rendered obsolete, history becomes the provenance of the individual 
and his or her own unique experiences. Historians such as Emmanuel LeRoy 
Ladurie and Carlo Ginzburg, working within the same savoir as Lyotard, 
explored the archives in search of these long-obscured individuals, an ap-
proach that necessitated the techniques of the Annales school and the use of 
non-traditional sources such as inquisition processes, deeds, and charters.32
Micro-historians, as they came to be called, argued that history is best told at 
the local level, not because the individual served as a Hegelian instantiation 
of social structure through which we might discern larger historical truths, 
but because the individual experiences embodied in archival texts refl ected 
an inherently relative lived history, making our understanding of the past 
more intimate. Even at this very intimate level, however, the historian is con-
fronted with the problem of reading the structured experience of a distant 
other through his or her own modern structured experience; thus the fi rst 
spinning pair in our double helix–the text and reader.
31  Jean-François LYOTARD, La condition postmoderne: raport sur le savoir. Paris: Editions 
Minuit 1979.
32  Emmanuel LeRoy LADURIE, Montaillou: village occitan de 1294 à 1324. Paris: Gallimard 
1975. Carlo GINZBURG, Il Formaggio e i  vermi: Il cosmo di un mugnaio del Cinquecento. 
Roma: Einaudi 1976. Peter BURKE, History and Social Th eory. Cambridge: Polity Press 2005, 
p. 41, passim.
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Th e deconstruction of the fundamental interface between text and 
reader became the focus of postmodernists such as Roland Barthes and 
Jacques Derrida. For both, human experience is linguistic and symbolic, 
“mediated by organized discourses” and signifi ers, and made manifest in 
stories and embodied in texts.33 Th e historian’s reading of these texts must 
of necessity be shattered into myriad mirrored shards. In his essay, “Th e 
Death of the Author,” Roland Barthes proposed that we must liberate the 
text from the tyranny of the author, much as Lyotard had freed history from 
the metanarrative. Barthes claims that to “give a  text an Author” and to 
interpret a text solely through the lens of that author is to “impose a limit 
on that text, to furnish it with a fi nal signifi ed, to close the writing.”34 With 
the removal of the singular authoritative vantage point of the author, “the 
claim to decipher a text becomes quite futile,” and the reader is empowered 
to interpret the text as an individual entity; because a single text will have, 
over time, a nearly infi nite number of readers, it will have as many inter-
pretations from a multitude of disciplinary angles, all of which are valid in 
their own right, and all of which spin around the central text much like the 
nucleobases in our double helix.
In 1966, Jacques Derrida delivered an address at Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity entitled “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human 
Sciences,“ in which he introduced the ideas of deconstruction and decenter-
ing.35 At the level of the text–beyond which there is nothing–deconstruction 
seeks binary oppositions and alternative interpretations formerly obscured 
by authoritative criticisms and grand narratives. Th rough close reading, 
Derrida sought these oppositions not only in what the author had included 
in the text, but also in what he or she had left  out, allowing lacunae to act as 
signifi ers. Within each text, then, these binary opposites spin and fracture 
around empty cores, allowing for myriad interpretations. Just as there is no 
privileged position from which to interpret a text, there is no genesis and no 
closure to discourse. Without traditional Western teleology as an anchor, 
discourse and human history are freed from an absolute chronology and 
are thus decentered. According to Derrida, because “reality” and “truth” 
do  not exist objectively or eternally, we are continually substituting one 
33  David B. MORRIS, “How to Speak Postmodern: Medicine, Illness, and Cultural Change.” 
Th e Hastings Center Report, vol. 30, 2000, no. 6, p. 8.
34  Roland BARHTES, “Death of the Author.” In: Image, Music, Text.” Stephen Heath (trans.). 
New York: Noonday 1977.
35  Jacques DERRIDA, “Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences.” In: 
Writing and Diff erence. Alan Bass (trans.). London: Routledge 1966, p. 278–294.
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decentered center for another in an endless chain of signifi ers and spinning 
interpretations.
From one perspective, the linguistic theories that serve as the founda-
tion of postmodernism must of necessity truly doom the historian of medi-
cine to infi nite levels of futile discourse. Th e rejection of human agency and 
fi xed reality, the continual questioning of discursive modes and meanings, 
the loss of narrative frameworks, the destructuring of texts down to indi-
vidual words and phrases–all of these things decenter the historian and all 
but eliminate his or her ability to say anything meaningful about the past 
or present. While postmodernist theories cannot suffi  ce as a building me-
dium in and of themselves, however, they can serve as a corrective and even 
constructive element in a  broader methodology, and can provide us with 
alternative lenses, such as double-coding and narrative medicine, through 
which to view the history of medieval and modern healing.
Charles Jencks’ theory of double coding, fi rst introduced in his 1977 Th e 
Language of Post-Modern Architecture, has allowed for the development of 
a  double-stranded approach to understanding medical history and prac-
tice.36 In the fi eld of architecture, double coding is the embedding of one 
architectural style in another, which produces a hybrid building that speaks 
two diff erent languages to several diff erent audiences simultaneously, thus 
allowing the double to become multiple. In the history of medicine, double 
coding could apply to a medieval medical manuscript, with its textual ac-
cretions from Greek and Arabic languages, and with overlays from pagan, 
Islamic, and Christian cultures. Take for example Ibn-Jazzar’s medical 
compendium for travelers, al-Musafi r, itself a composite of Greek, Latin, and 
Arabic sources, which was then translated into Latin in the late eleventh 
century by Constantine the African, and then copied and commented upon 
by medical students in thirteenth-century universities. Th is text, with its 
multiple codes, would speak diff erently to the medical professor, to the 
medical student, and to the theologian who borrowed a copy of the text. An-
other example would be thirteenth- and fourteenth-century canonization 
dossiers containing medicalized miracles that were rooted in the authorita-
tive languages of both medicine and theology; the authors of these miracles 
relied on double coding in order to prove the miraculous to papal clerics 
trained at university and conversant in one or both of these authoritative 
36  Charles JENCKS, Th e Language of Postmodern Architecture. New York: Rizzoli 1979.
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discursive regimes.37 Th ese same miracles, however, when read to an audi-
ence of supplicants on the feast day of the saint would speak in diff erent 
tongues dependent on the individual experiences and current circumstances 
of the hearer.
In both the medieval and modern milieux, double coding is inherent 
in the interrelationship between the biomedical and biocultural models, 
the fi rst of which is the domain of learned or “offi  cial” medicine, and the 
second of which is comprised of the multiple cultural, social, economic, 
and individual forces that shape the culture of healing in and beyond of-
fi cial medicine.38 Returning to our earlier metaphor, we might imagine the 
biomedical and biocultural models as two strands in the double helix, ever 
spinning around a decentered core. Th ese two strands, while perhaps closer 
in the medieval world, began to separate with the establishment of facul-
ties of medicine at medieval universities, the professionalization of medi-
cine, and the processes of licensure that began in the thirteenth century.39 
At this juncture, learned medicine began to defi ne itself as the only valid 
form of healing while marginalizing apothecaries and barber surgeons and 
actively persecuting traditional healers such as midwives. In the medieval 
biocultural strand that surrounded and interacted with learned medicine we 
might imagine the cult of the saints, local and offi  cial healing rituals both 
sacred and profane, as well as economic forces associated with agriculture 
and warfare, family dynamics, and individual disposition. In the modern 
milieu, the biomedical strand is dominated by Western scientifi c biomedi-
cine, which seeks objective truth in bench research and algorithmic decision 
making, and that sees the human body as a physical and chemical machine 
that occasionally malfunctions, the result of which is a  state we call “ill-
ness.” Th e modern biocultural perspective, which “takes as its provenance 
the large, unruly public discourses, from advertising to the experience of the 
sacred, in which culture extends its shaping power over health and illness,” 
acknowledges the validity of the biomedical viewpoint while simultaneously 
moving beyond and around it, arguing that illness is not merely the “mal-
37  Brenda GARDENOUR, Medicine and Miracle in the Later Middle Ages: Th e Reception of 
Learned Medicine Th e Reception of Th eory-Rich Medicine in the Hagiography of the Latin West. 
Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press (forthcoming).
38  David B. MORRIS, Illness and Culture in the Postmodern Age. Berkeley: University of 
California Press 1998.
39  Luis Garcia-Ballester, Michael R. McVaugh, Agustia Rubio-Vela “Medical Licensing and 
Learning in Fourteenth Century Valencia.” Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, New Series, vol. 79, 1989, no. 6, p. i-128.
Theorica et Practica:
98
function of a biophysical mechanism,” but instead is “the unique experience 
of a meaning-making and embodied cultural being.”40 Modern bioculture, 
like that of the later Middle Ages, includes healers and healing practices 
considered non-medical by physicians and other biomedical authorities, but 
nonetheless vital to the patient and those around him or her.
While the history and practice of medicine have long focused on the 
authoritative voice of the physician and his art, increasingly it is the voices of 
the biocultural strand, and particularly that of the patient, that are shaping 
the way we understand the complexities of concepts such as illness, healing, 
and empathy. Th is turn towards patient narrative is a product of Foucault, 
Lyotard, Barthes, Derrida, and a  postmodernist agenda that advocates 
for the deconstruction of authoritative regimes of power while liberating 
the hitherto inaudible voices of the past and present. Th is does not mean, 
however, that the biomedical model ceases to exist; on the contrary, patient 
narrative–whether the miracle tale from the fourteenth century or a modern 
account of electroconvulsive shock therapy–is in continual conversation 
with the authoritative languages and practices of learned medicine.41 Post-
modernist theory allows us to see in these narratives not only the individual 
viewpoints of the patient, but also the myriad infl uences that shape his or her 
perceptions of the multivalent, amorphous, deconstructed, and decentered 
metastructures of medicine, disease, and healing.
Th e passage from Foucault through postmodernism is the movement 
from the binary to the plural. Decentering and deconstruction have opened 
the history of medicine, broadly construed, to a wide variety of disciplines 
and liberated the voices of those once unheard beneath the powerful 
discourses of authority. Problematically, the historian of medicine is now 
faced with a  multiplicity of viewpoints swirling around an unattainable, 
relative, and perhaps non-existent truth. Furthermore, if we are to hold 
fast to postmodernist theory, we are bound by a  closed linguistic system 
that limits human agency in processes of change. Th e amorphous nature 
40  David B. MORRIS, “How to Speak Postmodern: Medicine, Illness, and Cultural Change.” 
Th e Hastings Center Report, vol. 30, 2000, no. 6, p. 8.
41  Roger Cooter rails against this in “Aft er Death/Aft er-‘Life’: Th e Social History of Medicine 
in Post-Postmodernity.” Th e Social History of Medicine, vol. 20, 2007, no. 3, p. 441–464. Patient 
narrative in the social history of medicine is merely the “other side of the same coin of the 
older history of medicine conducted from the top down. By the very nature of that oposition, 
the idea of a patient-orientated history of medicine could only reveal more stories about the 
exercise of power and the reproduction of power relations by the medical profession, including 
stories of resistance which simply reinforced the same notion of power.” p. 447.
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of postmodernism, with its propensity to fracture, shift , and loop back to 
the theoretical, makes it diffi  cult for the historian to speak critically about 
concrete facts, moments, and ideas. Roger Cooter sees in this the potential 
death of the history of medicine. In his “Aft er Death/Aft er-‘Life:’ Th e Social 
History of Medicine in Post-Postmodernity,” Cooter argues that postmod-
ernist approaches have limited the abilities of the medical historian, and 
particularly the social historian of medicine, to engage with the realities of 
the biomedical model and to eff ect meaningful change in the modern world. 
Because of the reactionary nature of postmodernist theory, it can never exist 
free from the tyranny of the authority against which it rails. Th e time has 
come, he argues, for the history of medicine to (once again) root itself in the 
Foucauldian dialectic of Power/Knowledge and to take as its new focus the 
biosciences and biopolitics. Cooter’s detractors, including Jonathan Toms, 
argue that such an approach merely repackages and reinforces the same 
constrictive and authoritative system that Cooter himself seeks to destroy.42
Ultimately, all of these infi nite voices–that of the medieval physician, 
the cancer survivor, the Beguine nurse, the pharmacogeneticist, the faith 
healer, the mentally disabled individual, the social historian, and the em-
piricist–are narrative elements in a  larger chain of human discourse that 
spans centuries of written and material culture, and each of them is valid 
and necessary for a holistic understanding of the past and present. Just as no 
one narrative should take precedent, so also no single theoretical approach 
to the history of medicine should dominate the discussion; instead, all of 
these lenses might be imagined circling strand aft er strand, text aft er text, 
spinning–always spinning–against and alongside larger social, cultural, and 
intellectual forces.
Practica: Historical epistemology and the detangling of medieval 
medicine from modern medical discursive regimes
Over the past two decades, the history of medieval medicine, with dates 
ranging roughly from the seventh century to the fourteenth and a  geo-
graphical span encompassing the Dar al-Islam, Western and Eastern Europe 
and the Mediterranean basin, has become a vigorous fi eld of study. As a fi eld 
of inquiry it is not only expansive, but also complex; medieval scholars must 
42  Jonathan TOMS, “So What? A Reply to Roger Cooter’s ‘Aft er Death/Aft er-‘Life’: Th e Social 
History of Medicine in Post-Postmodernity.’ ” Social History of Medicine, vol. 22, 2009, no. 3, 
p. 609–615.
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encounter the past through a broad array of sources, including artifacts of 
material culture, such as surgical tools and votive off erings, the architecture 
and geographical orientation of hospitals, healing shrines, and leper colonies 
and in some cases, evidence from paleopathology.43 Th e most vital sources for 
medieval medicine, however, are the myriad manuscripts that have survived 
largely through accident and are now housed in archives across the globe. 
Composed in Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin as well as vernacular lan-
guages such as Occitan, Low German, Old and Middle English, and written 
by hand using inconsistent forms of abbreviation that sometimes amount to 
a secret code, these sources present the medieval scholar with several chal-
lenges. First, the medievalist must travel to distant archives in order to access 
these sources, although this is slowly changing with the digital revolution; 
such travel requires time and funding. Second, once at the archives, he or 
she must have a working knowledge not only of the appropriate so-called 
dead language, but also of paleography and codicology, in order to be able 
to decipher, date, and contextualize the manuscript itself. All of this takes 
place even before the intricate processes of interpretation and synthesis nec-
essary in the production of new knowledge about the past. Th e training of 
a medieval historian and research in medieval medicine are both, perforce, 
arduous and time-consuming. In the present and ever-shift ing academic 
milieu which increasingly focuses on relevance, utility, and profi tability, the 
study of medieval medicine, and with it all pre-modern medicine, has come 
under question. To what end, some would ask, is such an investment of time 
and money, both commodities in short supply aft er the global fi nancial crisis 
of 2008? In light of the modern western biomedical achievement, the sheer 
strength of the biomedical strand, what purpose can be served by studying 
the history of old, irrelevant, in fact failed pseudo-medicine?
Historical epistemology as sketched in very broad strokes above off ers 
theoretical viewpoints and intellectual tools that can help us untangle the 
biases inherent in these questions, re-envision the history of medieval medi-
cine as valid within its own specifi c rationality, and liberate the voices of 
the past that they might speak meaningfully in the present. I will begin by 
contextualizing the very questions themselves within the discursive com-
munity of mainstream western biomedicine as taught in modern Anglo 
medical schools. As a discursive regime, academic medical discourse defi nes 
43  See Monica GREEN, “Baths, Blossoms, and Bones.” In: Medieval Academy News: Online, 
2010 [online]. 2010. Available at: <http://www.medievalacademy.org/medacnews/2010-1news/
GreenGoddess.html> [cit. 5. 1. 2011].
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itself, its theories, and its practices by a set of shared assumptions of which 
its members are acutely aware (epistemology), as well as by overarching 
beliefs and ideals that connect it with scientifi c culture broadly construed 
of which its members are far less aware (knowledge/savoir). It is the deeper 
level of savoir that guides medical inquiry and delineates truth or falsity 
which, in turn, shapes both medical theory and practice. In modern medical 
discourse, “truth” must be “proven” by the most recent medical research, 
which in turn yields data that can be validated beyond human subjectiv-
ity and applied in clinical practice. Th is truth constitutes unquestionable 
authority, a “regime of truth” driven by and for medical power.
Th is culture of hyper-modernity,44 provable truth, and utilitarianism is 
relevant to our discussion of medieval medicine not because of any continu-
ity between past and present, but because the view that medieval medicine 
is failed medicine and that its history is, therefore, irrelevant is cast from 
and rooted in this very perspective. Furthermore, untangling the hidden 
warp and weft  of modern medicine reveals the ways in which the tradi-
tional narrative of the history of medicine is bound to and by these deeper 
structures. By unchaining the narrative of medieval medicine from that of 
modern medicine, we liberate it from the modern discursive regime of truth, 
allowing medieval truth and falsity to exist as they were constructed in the 
academic medical milieu of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In this 
way, medieval medical theories and practices deemed “monstrous” by mod-
ern savoir become logical and natural when contextualized within their own 
specifi c medieval rationality.45 Released from modern delineations of truth 
and falsity, unbound from the narrative of modern biomedicine, the history 
of medieval medicine is no longer simply an esoteric tale of failed attempts 
at understanding disease and the body, but a cluster of narratives centered 
on healing practices that are legitimate, although far diff erent from our own.
Th e specifi c rationality of modern medicine has been shaped by a net-
work of historical phenomena native to the twentieth century, a full assess-
ment of which is beyond the scope of this inquiry. An exploration of the 
changes in Anglo-centered biomedical education in the twentieth and early 
twenty-fi rst centuries, however, will reveal the emergence of key epistemolo-
44  For hypermodernity in general, see Gilles LIPOVETSKY – Sébastien CHARLES, 
Hypermodern Times. Cambridge: Polity Press 2005. For hypermodernity in medicine, see 
Rodney James GIBLETT, Th e Body of Nature and Culture. New York: Palgrave – McMillan 
2008.
45  See Richard KIECKHEFER, “Th e Specifi c Rationality of Medieval Magic.” Th e American 
Historical Review, vol. 99, 1994, no. 3, p. 813–836.
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gies within medical discourse and, through these, the deeper structures 
guiding modern medical delineations of truth. Our story begins with Abra-
ham Flexner46 and his 1910 Report, commissioned by Henry Pritchett of the 
Carnegie Foundation and members of the American Medical Association 
(AMA), which proposed a drastic reform of North American medical educa-
tion from the classroom to the clinic.47 His survey of institutions across the 
United States and Canada found that many medical students were unpre-
pared for the rigors of medical school and that the education provided by 
many of these institutions was lacking in substance. Of particular concern 
for Flexner was the minimal role played by the hard sciences in medical 
instruction; in response, he advocated for a medical curriculum founded on 
anatomy and physiology, pathology, and pharmacology and supported by 
the humanities, including the history of medicine.48 Hard sciences studied 
in the classroom were to be reinforced in clinical training which was to take 
place in a  teaching hospital attached to a university. Every element of the 
curriculum, he argued, should be oriented toward clinical practice and the 
fostering of the physician-patient relationship.
Th rough the twentieth century, medical education became ever-more 
fi rmly ensconced in the university system and was increasingly focused on 
scientifi c research. Bench research in medicine received generous physical 
and fi scal support from the university not only because it brought notoriety 
and prestige to the institution, but also because it garnered government 
grant money. In 1910, Flexner had argued that the goal of medicine, which 
was both a science and an art, was better clinical practice; medical research, 
likewise, was to be directed towards this clinical end. By the mid-twentieth 
century, however, medicine came to identify itself as predominantly scien-
tifi c in orientation, and medical research was to be conducted for the ad-
46  Th omas Neville BONNER, Iconoclast: Abraham Flexner and a Life in Learning. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press 2002.
47  Abraham FLEXNER, Medical education in the United States and Canada: A  report to 
the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching with an introduction by Henry S. 
Pritchett. New York: Merrymount Press 1910. Th e American Medical Association used its 
own standards to determine the validity of medical schools and published the results in its 
mouthpiece, the Journal of the American Medical Association. Th e AMA, through the work 
of Flexner, eff ectively became the accrediting body of for higher education in medicine. See 
Charles E. ROSENBERG, Th e Structure of American Medical Practice. Philadelphia: Th e 
University of Pennsylvania Press 1983, p. 65–66.
48  Molly COOKE – David M. IRBY – William SULLIVAN – Kenneth M. LUDMERER, 
“American Medical Education 100 Years aft er the Flexner Report.” Th e New England Journal 
of Medicine, vol. 355, 2006, no. 13, 1339 (1339–1344).
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vancement of knowledge that was quite oft en distant from medical practice. 
Th e discovery of the double helix by Watson and Crick in 1953, for example, 
heralded the advent of molecular medicine, which further drove a  wedge 
between the lab bench, the classroom, and clinical practice.49 Subsequent 
advances, including DNA polymerase in 1956, the role of double-x chro-
mosomes in sex diff erentiation in 1961, and the publication of the fi rst cata-
logue of genetic disorders, Mendelian Inheritance in Man in 1966 signifi ed 
changes at the level of archaeology, wherein deeper structures had shift ed to 
accommodate new truths.50 In the life-world, this shift  shaped a new type of 
medicine, one in which the body was no longer a larger structure that could 
be interpreted through human touch, vision, or narrative, but a fragmented 
collection of tiny mechanisms that might only be revealed through the most 
advanced technology. Physicians and medical students were faced with 
a rapidly-changing sea of technical information, with each wave altering or 
overturning previous fi ndings. Memorization could no longer suffi  ce for the 
student, and personal experience was no longer suffi  cient for the practicing 
physician. Th e question of how to make effi  cient use of so much scientifi c 
data, these endless chains of shift ing facts, became paramount. Th e answer 
was an algorithm known as Evidence-Based Medicine, or EBM.
Th e term evidence-based medicine was coined in an article, “Evidence-
Based Medicine Working Group: Evidence-based medicine: a new approach 
to teaching the practice of medicine,” which was written by Gordon Guyatt 
and his colleagues at McMaster University and published in the Journal 
of the American Medical Association in 1992.51 Four years later, a  leading 
scholar in the fi eld of EBM, Dr. David Sackett, defi ned EBM as “the consci-
entious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making deci-
sions about the care of the individual patient. It means integrating individual 
clinical expertise with the best available external clinical evidence from 
systematic research.”52 In this system, the practicing physician evaluates, 
diagnoses, and prescribes treatment for a patient based on the most recent 
and convincing scientifi c research as represented in the clinical literature. 
49  Paul STRATHERN, Crick, Watson, and DNA. London: Arrow 1997.
50  Ronald J. TRENT, Molecular Biology. Edinburgh: Elsevier Publishing 2005, p. 2. See also, 
Susan LINDEE, Moments of Truth in Genetic Medicine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005.
51  Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group. “Evidence-Based Medicine: A New Aproach to 
Teaching the Practice of Medicine.” JAMA, vol. 268, 1992, no. 17, 2420–2425.
52  David SACKETT, Evidence-Based Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM. 2nd edition. 
London: Churchill Livingtone 2000.
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While EBM claims to take into consideration “patient values,” the emphasis 
is clearly on clinical evidence.53 Nowhere is this more evident than in the 
EBM algorithm, which has fi ve steps: assess the clinical problem presented 
by the patient and construct a clinical question from the case; conduct ap-
propriate research on the question; assess the validity and applicability of 
the evidence gathered; apply this knowledge in the treatment of the patient; 
self-assess one’s personal performance and its eff ect on the outcome of the 
case.54 Fundamentally, the EBM process is meant to keep physicians abreast 
of the most recent research in medical science and, through this, to provide 
patients with state-of-the-art medical care.
EBM, which represents a  paradigm shift  in medical practice and 
education, developed in response to very modern problems, including: the 
“daily need for valid information about diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, and 
prevention;” the limitations of traditional sources which are oft en out of 
date, incorrect, overwhelming in volume and unsystematic in approach; and 
the diff erential between the physician’s clinical experience, which increases 
over time, and his or her “up-to-date knowledge,” which oft en decreases 
over time. 55 Perhaps the most potent impetus behind the proliferation of 
EBM is the limited amount of time that the average practitioner can dedi-
cate to researching clinical problems (only a few seconds per patient) and to 
general reading in medicine broadly construed (roughly one half hour per 
week).56 In the fast-paced world of modern medicine, effi  ciency in fi nding 
and assimilating evidence is key. While EBM developed in response to such 
recent phenomena, it nevertheless also speaks to Flexner’s 1910 authoritative 
injunction that medical education and practice be founded in scientifi cally-
oriented medical research and that all elements of medical education be 
focused on clinical outcomes. From both standpoints, EBM seems to make 
clear, sound, and rational sense. Like any system, however, it has signifi cant 
limitations, not the least of which are the complications that arise from 
applying an algorithm to the highly-complex and oft en chaotic problem of 
human disease and suff ering. Proponents of EBM claim that the purpose 
53  Mita GIACOMINI, “Th eory-Based Medicine and the Role of Evidence: Why the Emperor 
Needs New Clothes Again.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, vol. 52, 2009, no. 2, 
p. 234–249.
54 David SACKETT, “Evidence-Based Medicine: What It Is and What it Isn’t.” British Medical 
Journal, vol. 312, 1996, no. 71, p. 71–72. Also see Sharon E. STRAUS et al., “Evidence-Based 
Medicine: How to Practice and Teach EBM.” Edinburgh: Elsevier Press 2005, p. 3–4.
55  STRAUS et al., “Evidence-Based Medicine,” p. 3.
56  Ibid.
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of this system is to provide the best and most effi  cient medical care to the 
patient, whose culture and viewpoints play a signifi cant role in the process; 
in practice, however, it is scientifi c research and externally validated statisti-
cal data that prove most vital to determining therapy, and the human patient 
beyond the mechanical body is lost in a world of evidence, outcomes, and 
assessable products.
Under the Foucauldian gaze, the dispotif of EBM reveals elements of 
the deeper archaeological assumptions that shape it. Th e fi rst assumption is 
that medicine is objective. While the physician uses his or her own clinical 
experiences to shape elements of practice, decisions are to be as objective 
as possible and rooted in clinical research. Emotions, spirituality, and/or 
value judgments on the part of the practitioner are not objective and there-
fore have no valid role to play in medical theory or practice.57 Th e second 
assumption is that science itself is objective, based on validated data gener-
ated through laboratory and clinical research; in other words, science yields 
verifi able truths that exist beyond human subjectivity. Only the most recent 
research is valid, and truths yielded by this research displace all previous 
research fi ndings. Simultaneous truths in this schema are impossible, and 
data yielded by “non-scientifi c” means is of necessity invalid. Th e third as-
sumption is that the physician alone is qualifi ed to discern between true 
and false within this discursive regime of power. Physicians, because they 
are in possession of “medical facts” are vested with “the ultimate authority 
to decide what to do based on those facts.”58 Th e patient is merely the object 
of the clinical gaze,59 and his or her body–separate from any subjective ex-
perience–is but a collection of microscopic machines that can be separated, 
repaired, and replaced to restore what we call health. Lastly is the assump-
tion that “health” is the natural state for the human body, that illness is 
the negation of that state and therefore an aberration to the natural order 
of things. With such a premise, physical suff ering can serve no spiritual or 
abstracted purpose; on the contrary, pain is valuable only as a signifi er of 
57  Th is view is slowly being repudiated by individual physicians such as Robert M. VEATCH, 
whose book, Patient Heal Th yself: How the New Medicine Puts the Patient in Charge (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2009), argues that all medical practices–even those that are based 
squarely on science and seem objective in their banality–involve value judgments on the part 
of the physician. Th e value judgments that should take precedent, he argues, are those of the 
patient.
58  VEATCH, Patient Heal Th yself, p. 6.
59  On the medical gaze see Michel FOUCAULT, Th e Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of 
Medical Perception. New York: Pantheon Books 1973.
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disorder within the body that, having served its purpose, should be elimi-
nated as quickly as possible.60
Such assumptions shape not only how we defi ne medicine and medi-
cal truth in the tyranny of the present, but also how we judge, categorize, 
and defi ne healing practices in the recent and distant past. It is here that 
concepts derived from postmodernism can aid the historian in decentering 
discourse and multiplying narratives to reveal a richer, deeper, multivalent 
vision of medicine and its history. Mainstream western biomedicine–the 
biomedical strand–accepts only its own methods and epistemologies as 
valid, a viewpoint that has held fi rm despite repeated attempts over the past 
several decades to integrate medical humanities courses, many of which 
focus on medical ethics, into the medical curriculum.61 A  postmodernist 
approach complicates this viewpoint, fi rst by introducing the biocultural 
strand spinning alongside and in conversation with western biomedicine, 
and second by liberating the myriad voices within it. For example, healing 
practices labeled “non-medical” by medical authority and discounted as 
statistically irrelevant according to the algorithmic model have no place in 
biomedical discourse. In shift ing our gaze to the biocultural strand, however, 
practices such as herbal medicines, vibration therapy, Chi Gong and Tong 
Ren,62 Ayurveda, acupuncture, meditation and prayer are liberated from the 
authoritative discursive regime of biomedicine. No longer merely “alterna-
tive” medicines, such practices and the narratives that surround them have 
validity within their own cultural and historical contexts.
In modern context, perhaps the most valuable theoretical and practi-
cal contribution of postmodernism is the liberation of the patient’s voice 
from the authority of the physician. Patient narrative, which is inherently 
double-coded, links the biocultural and biomedical strands and is valid in 
both contexts. Th e increased emphasis on the individual and his or her story 
is changing not only the experience of illness for countless people who once 
suff ered in silence and isolation, but also the medical gaze which is slowly 
coming to value the process of narrative in the practice of modern medicine. 
Narrative medicine, as it has come to be known, “fortifi es clinical practice 
60  Th is opinion is quite clear in Veatch, who states that “Only those with a distorted theology 
claim[ed] that the suff ering was so good for one’s character that the pain should be endured.” 
VEATCH, Patient Heal Th yself, p. 5.
61  Delease WEAR, “Creating Diffi  culties Everywhere.” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 
vol. 50, 2007, no. 3, p. 348–362.
62  Tom TAM, Tong Ren Th erapy: Beyond Acupuncture. New York: Oriental Cultural Institute 
2007.
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with the narrative competence to recognize, absorb, metabolize, interpret, 
and be moved by the stories of illness;”63 the processes of telling and listen-
ing to stories of illness is both therapeutic for the patient and instructive 
for the physician, who comes to empathize with the patient and, perhaps, 
discern therapeutic approaches that are meaningful for the patient within 
his or her own individual context. Narrative medicine moves beyond the 
harried approach of EBM to engage with patients as autonomous, unique, 
acculturated beings, not merely as examples of disease states. Th is shift  from 
general diagnostic categories to individual patient therapy harkens back to 
Hippocrates and humoral medicine, which argued that each human body 
had its own unique state of humoral balance and therefore health. In prac-
tice, then, the physician had to be intimately familiar with his patients and 
their emotional states, living conditions, family dynamics, daily diets, and 
full histories in order to determine diagnosis and therapies, each of which 
was perforce unique to each patient. Narrative medicine is one return to 
this emphasis on the individual patient; genomic medicine, in which each 
human body is truly a unique organism, is yet another.
While historical epistemology has facilitated the deconstruction of 
the authoritative discourses of modern biomedicine, allowing the single to 
become a decentered chain of spinning pluralities, it has also allowed for the 
liberation of medieval medicine from modern medical discourse. Modern 
medical epistemology and archaeology negate the possibility of the positive 
and meaningful existence of medicine in the Middle Ages because, from 
the vantage point of the biomedical strand, medieval medicine was not only 
false, but monstrous, and therefore not medicine at all. Veatch provides an 
example of this modern medical bias in his introduction to Patient Heal 
Th yself, in which he describes all pre-modern medicine as primitive in its 
ignorance of the scientifi c notions of “cause and eff ect. It believed in the 
power of evil spirits, magical forces, and bewitching. It had no understand-
ing of scientifi c evidence.”64 He goes on to state that “modern medicine is 
nothing if not scientifi c. At its best it refuses to tolerate, without scientifi c 
testing, folk beliefs about causes and cures.”65 So here we have the dialectic 
between modern (scientifi c-rational-objective-valid) and non-modern (un-
63  From the “Mission Statement of the Program in Narrative Medicine” at Columbia University, 
College of Physicians and Surgeons.
64  Ibid.
65  Ibid.
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scientifi c-irrational-subjective-invalid) as seen through the lens of modern 
biomedicine.
Modern and medieval medicine, however, are rooted in two very dif-
ferent life worlds, each of which is shaped by its own unique set of episte-
mologies and archaeologies, and little can be gained by using one system 
to qualify or disqualify the other. To view one system through the savoir of 
the other only reinforces our own belief systems regarding the human body, 
nature, truth, and proof. For example, when Veatch describes pre-modern 
medicine as a realm of “evil spirits” devoid of any understanding of “cause 
and eff ect,” he is guided by modern savoir concerning the bounded body and 
the validity of modern scientifi c methods. Because medieval conceptions of 
cause and eff ect do not align with modern ones, and medieval theories and 
practices do not fall into modern medical categorizations, medieval medicine 
cannot exist as “real medicine,” and must therefore be superstition, magic, 
or monstrosity. Part of Veatch’s dismay and disapprobation perhaps stems 
from the positivist belief that medicine has evolved along a continuum, and 
that all true medicine is linked across time and space as it grows ever more 
perfect. Medieval medicine, however, does not fi t into a streamlined logical 
narrative from the great man, Hippocrates, to the wonders of nuclear and 
genetic therapies. It must, therefore, have been a mistake.
Historical epistemology, founded in the ideas of Cavailles, Foucault, 
Davidson, and Hacking allows the historian to disrupt this false continuum 
and to unchain medieval medicine from modern medicine. In liberating 
these two medical systems and setting them within the historical and 
epistemological contexts that both shaped and were shaped by them, the 
historian can explore the theories, practices, and culture of medieval medi-
cine, as well as the deeper knowledge that guided them, without having 
to anachronistically justify them according to modern medical discourse. 
Gone is the need for a  lineage of great men through the millennia; gone 
the need to emphasize successes and ignore failures in the service of the 
modern narrative of medical history. What remains are two systems, valid 
in their own rights, equal and rational. Th is is the true power of histori-
cal epistemology, for it forces us not only to acknowledge the validity of 
otherness, but also to question the validity of our own constructs. For those 
who hold the same biases as Veatch, such a prospect is threatening. For to 
accord the medieval physician status as a learned man of medicine, to give 
credit to the complexity of medieval medical education, to grant medieval 
medicine validity as medicine within its own rational system is, ultimately, 
to question our modern belief in scientifi c progress, the effi  cacy of modern 
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medicine, the perfectibility of the body, and the unquestionable authority 
of the modern physician.
While historical epistemology allows for the liberation and validation 
of medieval medicine and its history, postmodernist approaches simulta-
neously complicate the narrative of medieval medicine itself. Historians of 
medicine have oft en focused on the twelft h-century translation movement, 
the development of faculties of medicine in medieval universities such as 
Paris and Bologna, the rise of medicine as a profession, and the theories and 
practices associated with the university-trained physician.66 Moving away 
from the medieval biomedical strand, however, reveals a world of healing 
beyond the authoritative voice of the physician and learned medicine, one 
populated by apothecaries and barber surgeons, folk healers, midwives, 
and family members, all of whom might provide meaningful health care to 
individuals in times of suff ering.67 Talismans, amulets, relics, and healing 
rituals such as those seen in the tenth-century Lacnunga texts and Stephen 
of Bourbon’s thirteenth-century account of the cult of Saint Guinefort were 
as much a part of the fabric of medieval healing, if not more so, as learned 
medicine, which was available only to the wealthy or those in urban areas, 
such as Barcelona and Valencia, that had public physicians appointed by 
the local government.68 Historians such as Debra Blumenthal working with 
archival sources such as inquisition texts and canonization dossiers have 
attempted to liberate the narratives of patients and healers from discursive 
regimes of their original authors, providing yet one more set of lenses 
through which we might re-vision medieval healing. And then there are the 
viewpoints off ered by theologians and supplicants, saints and sinners, on the 
relative value of health compared with the spiritual and redemptive value of 
suff ering, a condition that was in some cases considered a divine gift , and 
oft en seen as evidence for God’s continual presence in the physical realm.
Critics of Foucauldian and postmodernist approaches to understand-
ing texts and contexts have argued that theories such as decentering and 
66  Nancy SIRAISI, Medieval and Early Renaissance Medicine: An Introduction to Knowledge 
and Practice. Chicago: Chicago University Press 1990; Cornelius O’BOYLE, Th e Art of 
Medicine: Medical Teaching at the University of Paris, 1250–1400. Leiden: Brill 1998.
67  Monica GREEN, Women’s Healthcare in the Medieval West: Texts and Contexts. Aldershot: 
Ashgate Press 2000.
68  Richard KIECKHEFER, Magic in the Middle Ages. New York: Cambridge University Press 
1990. Karen JOLLY, Popular Religion in Late Saxon England: Elf Charms in Context. Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press 1996. Michael R. MCVAUGH, Medicine Before the 
Plague: Practitioners and Th eir Patients in the Crown of Aragon, 1285–1345. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1993.
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deconstruction have not only destroyed the grand narrative, but also the 
ideas of concrete truth, leaving a vacuum that cannot be fi lled. If historians 
were to adhere strictly to modernist and postmodernist theories without 
a solid grounding in historical context as revealed in textual and material 
culture, these accusations would be valid. A mindful weaving together of 
both philosophical and historical approaches, however, allows for engage-
ment with present and past through myriad vistas in an ever changing world 
of shift ing signifi ers and relative truths, while remaining grounded in the 
endless permutations of human experience.
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